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Abstract 
 
The Aberration of Eritrean Secession, 1961-1993 
 
Charles Girard Thomas, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor:  Toyin Falola 
 
Despite its reputation for instability and weak states, the continent of Africa has seen very 
few attempts at secession.  The 1960s saw the early attempts of Katanga and Biafra to 
split away from their host states, only for these attempts to be crushed in short order.  
Since then there have only been a handful of notable attempts at secession and none of 
these have borne permanent fruit despite the persistence of the separatist fronts (although 
the Southern Sudan may now finally be embarking on its own separate existence).  In 
each case, from Katanga to Somaliland, the theoretical state has encountered resistance 
on the national, regional, and global scale to their existence and has never yet been 
recognized.  However, despite these setbacks, there currently has been a single successful 
secession in Africa: that of Eritrea. 
 Eritrea faced the same political and military difficulties that all other secession 
attempts have faced in Africa.  Their host state of Ethiopia was perhaps the most revered 
on the continent and had a wealth of international support throughout the thirty year 
conflict.  The Organization of African Unity and its members remained unrelentingly in 
 vii
favor of territorial integrity for all African States.  The Eritreans could not even gain 
regional recognition for their struggle.  Despite these adverse circumstances, Eritrea 
prevailed in its struggle for independence.  Critical to this success were four interwoven 
factors that allowed them to overcome those barriers that had stopped their secessionist 
predecessors: the anomalous history of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eritreans' practice of the 
theories of protracted war, the simultaneous social revolution the Eritreans carried out, 
and finally the Eritreans' pragmatic relations with their surrounding dissident groups.  
This work argues that these four central factors were the keys to Eritrea's aberrant and so 
far unique victory in their struggle for secession.   
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Introduction 
 The advent of decolonization in Africa in the 1960s was driven forward by the 
global drive for self-determination following the Second World War.  The formation of 
the United Nations had established the conception of the peoples of the world choosing 
their own destiny as a cornerstone of postwar global relations, with Article 1, Section 2 of 
the UN Charter stating the purpose of the organization was “to develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and  self-determination 
of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”  With 
this in mind the colonized world began agitating for its own sovereign leadership, to be 
led by their own people and governments.  The first African state to taste victory in this 
regard was Ghana in 1957 and by 1960 this process reached a fever pitch, with seventeen 
separate African nations emerging as recognized independent nations that year alone. 
However, with the beginning of African decolonization there began to be questions as to 
what self-determination meant on the continent.  The process so far had been to offer 
sovereign status to what were still colonial constructs; the governments often followed 
along inherited colonial patterns, the militaries were those that had been built by their 
colonial masters, the economies were essentially unchanged from the days of 
colonialism, and most importantly the borders were still those that had been created 
seventy-five years earlier at the Berlin Conference.  As such, what was actually being 
given self-determination were just those frameworks that had been created in the colonial 
era and this did not satisfy the aspirations of all Africans.  Many wanted to determine 
their own states outside the boundaries drawn in Europe four generations ago and were 
willing to fight to get them.  Their aspirations put them in direct conflict with the new 
 2
African states; the advent of African independence was also the advent of African 
secession. 
 These early attempts at secession caused considerable consternation to their host 
nations.  In 1960 the province of Katanga attempted to secede from the Congo.  Katanga 
was a rich province with many deposits of copper and other valuable minerals but despite 
its providing roughly 50% of the tax income of the new state,1 their representation within 
the central government was minimal.  This led them to declare their own independence 
from the central state and seek patronage and recognition from ts former colonizer 
Belgium and other Western powers.  As the Congo under its fiery Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba was in the middle of a political firestorm both at home and abroad, Katanga 
felt it had a strong chance to be the first new state in Africa.  These hopes were mistaken; 
following a chaotic series of events culminating with the assassination of the popular 
Lumumba on Katangan soil public perception turned against the secessionist regime.  It 
was brought under increasing pressure by the United Nations and eventually military 
action was undertaken to bring it back under the control of the Congolese government.  
By 1963 Katanga no longer existed as a separate entity in the Congo. 
 This was followed in 1967 by the secession of Biafra from Nigeria.  A series of 
coups and counter-coups through 1965-66 ignited a pogrom against the Igbo ethnic 
minority across Northern and Western Nigeria.  Igbos across the nation retreated to their 
ancestral homeland of Eastern Nigeria and following a series of tense negotiations with 
between the leader Colonel Emeka Ojukwu and the central military dictator Yakubu 
Gowon the Eastern region split from Nigeria, declaring itself Biafra and calling for 
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international recognition.  Unfortunately, little support was forthcoming.  The earlier 
Katanga conflict had soured the United Nations on intervention in regional African 
conflicts.  They instead insisted that such actions were the province of the new regional 
organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which immediately took steps to 
mediate the conflict.  The OAU took a strict line that the territorial integrity of African 
states must be respected at all costs, dooming the chances of any regional intervention.2  
Following a daring but ultimately unsuccessful offensive, the Biafrans were slowly 
ground down by the larger and more well-equipped Nigerians.  Their siege mentality kept 
the struggle alive for three years, but ultimately Biafra was dissolved and Nigeria was 
reunited.   
 By the end of the 1960s the sole sovereignty of the African states had been 
established in international law.  The United Nations refused to intervene further and the 
OAU made the integrity of the current states and their sovereign control of all within 
them an immutable characteristic of African nations.3 This effectively killed the concept 
of secession in Africa; further attempts at separation, such as those of the Casamance 
region in Senegal, Cabinda in Angola, and the Azawad in Mali all came to naught despite 
popular sentiment behind them and often extremely weak host states.  Simply put, the 
African state had taken on permanence no matter their domestic state. 
 This understanding changed rapidly in 1993 when the UN Observer Mission to 
Verify the Referendum in Eritrea reported that the voters in Eritrea overwhelmingly 
supported separation from Ethiopia, leading to the declaration and recognition of Eritrea 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Jules Gerard-Libois.  Katanga Secession, trans. Rebecca Young (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966), 9. 
2 OAU Resolution 51, adopted at the Kinshasa meeting of the OAU, September 1967, Section C. 
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as a separate sovereign nation.  This was the climax of the thirty-year struggle of 
Eritreans for their independence, which had begun with little fanfare in 1961.  While the 
military operations had ended in 1991 with the entry of Eritrean and allied forces into 
Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, it had taken two years for the proper referendum to 
be organized and executed.  However, this did not change the fact that for the first time, 
an African state had seceded from its host.  Despite the continued isolation of secessionist 
insurgencies and the enduring precedents accepted by international actors, the Eritreans 
secured their independence.  This exceptional result was the result of four interwoven 
factors that allowed them to overcome those barriers that had stopped their secessionist 
predecessors: the anomalous history of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eritreans' practice of the 
theories of protracted war, the simultaneous social revolution the Eritreans carried out, 
and finally the Eritreans' pragmatic relations with their surrounding dissident groups.  
These factors and their overall effects in creating this unique result will be discussed at 
length in the following chapters, but this work contends that it was only the presence of 
these four factors and their interactions within the greater conflict that allowed Eritrea to 
achieve the previously impossible goal of secession.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 OAU Charter, Article III, section 2. 
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Chapter 1.  Eritrea: History of the Conflict 
 
 It is nearly impossible to truly pin down the starting date of the long conflicts for 
secession in Africa, as you may choose the formation of the mass movement that 
sustained it, the pivotal action that drove the mass movement, or the creation of the 
context which surrounded this action.  The Eritrean Secession might be said to have 
begun in 1958 when a group of Cairo based Eritrean exiles met and established the 
earliest clandestine organization for the liberation of Eritrea.  It equally might be said that 
those seeds were sown in the 1952 joining of the former Italian colony of Eritrea to 
Ethiopia or in the following years when various political factions fought to direct the 
impotent Eritrean Assembly.  There is also the obvious jumping off point of the Italian 
conquest of Eritrea in the late 19th century and subsequent intense development of the 
region following their crushing defeat at the hands of Menelink II at Adowa in 1896.  
Some scholars have even gone so far as to trace the validity of Eritrean sovereignty and 
struggles all the way back to the Axumite kingdoms of central Ethiopia and their 
intermittent warfare against the coastal Muslim pastoralists.  However, while all of these 
were to prove pivotal moments in the development of the nation of Eritrea, this study 
marks the beginning of the war proper on September 1st, 1961, when a small guerrilla 
band led by early dissenter Idris Hamid Awate opened fire at an Ethiopian police post in 
Western Eritrea.4  From this date until the United Nations referendum in 1993 that 
                                                 
4  See Dan Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution (Trenton, NJ: Red 
Sea Press, 1993), 58.  This is also accepted by the account of Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished 
Revolution (New York, NYL Praeger Publishing, 1980), 73.  Other studies sometimes choose 1962 as the 
starting year of the formal beginning of the conflict as this was the year the federation was officially 
dissolved.  A prime example of this dating of the conflict is Haggai Erlich, The Struggle Over Eritrea, 
1962-1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).  The 
authors have chosen the 1961 start date as this book is a study of secessionist conflicts and as such the 
beginning of violence marks the beginning of interest. 
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established Eritrea as a separate sovereign nation, Eritreans fought a protracted conflict 
against Ethiopia and their numerous backers that featured guerrilla raids, pitched battles, 
a social revolution, the politicization of a population, and one of the worst famines the 
world had seen to date.  What emerged from this crucible of conflict was the sole 
successful secession in Africa since independence, a remarkable undertaking and an 
extremely interesting process, both as a case study of the difficulties involved in 
secession and the anomalous circumstances required to effect such a complete separation. 
  When the shots were fired by Awate and his fledgling Eritrean Liberation Front 
guerrillas in 1961, it was in response to the rising pressures of Eritrean Nationalism that 
had been unleashed following the Second World War.  From the late 19th century until 
1941, Eritrea had been a prosperous Italian colony, dubbed in the 1930s the centerpiece 
of dictator Benito Mussolini’s new Roman Empire.  The colony served as the staging 
area for fascist Italy’s subsequent invasion of Ethiopia and large numbers of Eritrean 
colonial troops were used to great effect against Emperor Haile Salassie’s troops.5  
However, with the expansion of the worldwide hostilities to East Africa in the 1940s, the 
Italians were driven out of their holdings by British East African forces and both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea were placed under British control.  While Haile Selassie was able to return to 
his throne in 1941, at the end of the war the British were left with the uncomfortable 
question of how to deal with Eritrea. In 1947 Italy formally renounced its claim to Eritrea 
or any of its other African territories, leaving the outcome even more uncertain.6  While 
political factions were already forming in the small state and struggling for their own 
                                                 
5  Connell, Against All Odds, 53.  There has been relatively little work done on the actual service of 
Eritrean Askaris in the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia but this service had lasting effects on the relations of the 
two regions.  
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particular hoped-for outcomes, the case was eventually handed over the United Nations 
for a final verdict.7  Although the United States hoped for a consolidation of their ally 
Ethiopia’s control over Eritrea, the Soviet bloc pushed for total separation between the 
two nations.  It was an acrimonious struggle mirrored by that within Eritrea where the 
Unionist Party pressed its traditional interests by supporting Union with Ethiopia against 
those of the Muslim League and the Liberal Progressive Party who favored Eritrean 
independence.  In the end, there was what might be at best termed a compromise, with 
Eritrean being joined to Ethiopia as a federated territory under the Ethiopian crown.8  
This of course was not much of a compromise to those favoring independence, as it still 
placed their foreign affairs, military, finance, and international commerce under the 
‘Federal’ government of an absolute monarchy.    
While the Eritrean nationalists were disheartened at the development, it was only 
the beginning of what would become complete Ethiopian dominance of the ‘federal’ 
arrangement.  Haile Selassie’s government completely nullified and then dismantled the 
Eritrean state over the next 10 years through a combination of money, informal influence, 
and often naked military intervention.  The very year of federation was the last year that 
free and open elections were held in Eritrea.  The constitution was suspended shortly 
thereafter and the jailing of dissident politicians and journalists soon followed.  In 1956 
Amharic was made the official language over the protests of the majority of the nation 
which had traditionally adopted Tigrinya or Arabic as their preferred languages.9  That 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  Ibid., 55 
7  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 21. 
8  Ibid., 23.  For the actual resolution, please reference Resolution 390A (V) passed on December 2, 
1950. 
9  Ibid., 27.  For a concrete representation of this linguistic policy, see Connell’s related anecdote in 
Against All Odds, 58-59. 
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same year the Assembly was “Temporarily Suspended.”  Although elections followed 
they were without direction or organization, leading to bitterly contested results.  The 
nascent Labor Union movement that had been growing in strength and organization was 
essentially driven from sight by a series of crushing blows dealt to it by the Federal 
military during protest strikes in 1958.10  This was followed in 1959 by the leaders of the 
Assembly voting to replace their own penal code with that of Ethiopia after one of their 
increasingly common visits to Addis Ababa.  By 1960 the main political supports of a 
separate Eritrea had been dissolved, with most governmental and grassroots organizations 
having been reduced to irrelevancy or driven from the country.  Even protests directed at 
the United Nations, which had created the rapidly crumbling federal system, were simply 
met with the response that all protests would have to pass through the federal government 
first- in this case the Emperor himself.11  The final curtain fell in 1962, when the 
Assembly was at last “persuaded” to vote itself out of existence, a process aided by 
armed police and jets providing air cover.  Eritrea was officially no more as of November 
14th, 1962.12 
 Of course, as the preceding paragraph notes, the first shots of the revolt against 
the Ethiopians occurred on September 1st, 1961.  Since 1958 there had been a group of 
expatriate notables that were already beginning their resistance against the creeping 
imperialism of Haile Selassie.  Formed in Cairo, the Eritrean Liberation Movement 
(ELM) was the first major organized dissenting group and consisted of members of the 
                                                 
10  Connell, Against All Odds, 58.  
11  Ibid., 57-58. 
12  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 29.  In terms of the threat of violence against the 
Ertirean Assembly, Connell claims Ethiopian jet fighters were buzzing the city and police had surrounded 
the assembly while the proceding were underway.  See Connell, Agaisnt All Odds, 57.  
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disenfranchised educated upper classes of Eritrea.  Many of its earliest known members 
were former members of the Eritrean Assembly, driven from their homes during the 
increasing violence of the Ethiopian repression.  Woldeab Woldemariam was a common 
example of the early Eritrean nationalist leadership.  A newspaperman and former 
representative from the Liberal Progressive Party, he was driven into exile by the events 
of the mid-1950s.  He served as an early figure for this educated dissent to rally around 
and still serves as a noble example of Eritrean nationalism.   Another figure that proved 
to be pivotal in both the ELM and its successor movements was Osman Saleh Sabbe of 
the Muslim League.13  He too was a staunch nationalist and served to consistently link 
Eritrea’s struggles with the greater post-colonial movements of the world, most notably 
Pan-Arabism.  However, despite their growing organization and outreach, the Eritrean 
Liberation Movement was anything but a monolithic endeavor.  While outreach was 
already beginning and underground urban organizing in Eritrea proper was underway, the 
movement itself fractured into several cliques and factions.  While the ELM was still 
trying to organize itself as a party in exile one of its splinter groups, the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF), took center stage and opened fire on the Ethiopians in 1961. 
 The decision to form itself into an armed struggle was a momentous one for the 
ELF and quickly propelled it into the spotlight.  Its guerrilla struggle brought it increasing 
attention and growth despite an incompletely articulated program, with little ideology 
aside from being fiercely devoted to the idea of Eritrean nationalism.  This would prove 
                                                 
13  Osman Saleh Sabbe has a very unique and complex role in the Eritrean Revolution, one that this 
study cannot fully explore.  Let it suffice to say that he served both major liberation fronts in senior 
positions before being forcibly removed from each in turn.   He then formed his own front to lead, although 
this was never a major force.  While a controversial figure due to his extremely conservative Islamist and 
Pan-Arab agenda, his strong supply and training connections with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other pan-Arab 
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to be enough as the struggle continued.  The ELM, never fully organized nor devoted to 
armed struggle, slowly came undone and from 1961-1965 the ELF made every effort to 
subsume or destroy its rival.  By 1965 this goal had been accomplished, with the few 
remaining ELM cadres being absorbed into the growing power of the ELF.  However, 
with its growth, the ELF had also inherited the same difficulties that the ELM had 
struggled with.  Eritrea itself housed almost equal populations of Christians and Muslims 
which were then even more divided amongst nine separate ethno-linguistic groups across 
what was now Ethiopia’s 14th province.  These divisions gave way into factionalism and 
competition within the Front, threatening it even as the Ethiopian military began to 
increase its pressure upon the nascent movement.  Taking their cue from the earlier 
success of the Algerian FLN, the leadership of the ELF decided to divide the nation into 
five “zones,” each overseen by a different commander who often represented the majority 
confessional and ethnic group.14  Unfortunately, this simply increased the rivalries, as 
each zone came to be run as a fiefdom and offered little cooperation to its neighbors in 
the face of increased resistance by the Ethiopian armed forces.  While the struggle 
continued and the guerrilla forces increased their pressure on both the cities and the 
countryside, the Ethiopian forces were being rearmed by massive infusions of aid from 
the United States.  From 1960 on the military aid alone to Ethiopia was staggering, with 
$10 million dollars a year in grants and loans being offered and from 1964 on material 
                                                                                                                                                 
states made him valuable enough for all involved to try and work with him for prolonged periods of time.  
He finished the struggle as a distrusted and largely irrelevant figure. 
14  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 74 among others including Alex DeWaal, Evil 
Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 41. 
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and logistical support continued to arrive.15  This made the struggle all the harder on the 
Eritrean guerrillas and the Ethiopian strategy continued to evolve to incorporate the 
massive advantages they accrued in armor, air superiority, and special counter-insurgency 
forces.  By 1968 it was becoming obvious that the Emperor’s troops were taking 
increased advantage of the zonal divisions, attacking each region in turn and inflicting 
terrible losses upon the isolated forces.  As the situation deteriorated cracks began to 
show within the ELF, culminating in the Anseba conference in September 1968.16  This 
was to prove another pivotal moment in the struggle for Eritrea as it established the Unity 
of three of the zones following a largely democratic process supported by both the 
civilians of the regions and the guerrillas fighting in them.  However, this action was not 
sanctioned by the ELF leadership nor was it accepted by the remaining two zonal 
commands, beginning another rift with the united front the Eritrean forces.  However, 
with the increasing weakness of the ELF’s position and the positive military results 
garnered by the united zones, it became obvious which way the winds were blowing.  In 
August of 1969 the remaining ELF leadership and zonal commanders met with the united 
zones’ commanders at Adobha.  
 The Adohba conference would prove to be one of the last attempts at a truly 
united front in Eritrea for nearly a decade.17  While the independent minded unified 
zones had seen better results in the recent struggles with Ethiopian troops, the ELF and its 
                                                 
15  Following Haile Salassie’s return, the United States became Ethiopia’s primary military partner 
and supplier, with the total amount of aid granted from 1946-1975 equaling approximately $286.1 million 
dollars.  For a total breakdown of these costs, see Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 176-177. 
16  Ibid., 43 and Connell, Against All Odds, 80.  Connell makes the clearest case for the Anseba 
meeting being the first move of the new radical foreign trained future leadership in creating a revolutionary 
front.   
17  Connell, Against All Odds, 80-82 and Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 43-44.  Both 
emphasize the contradictory accounts and ephemeral nature of the agreements at Adobha. 
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remaining zonal commanders still controlled the purse strings.  These offsetting dynamics 
combined with a strong desire for unity at any cost led to the resolutions adopted at the 
Adohba.  All the zones were reconnected under a sole leadership council which now 
styled itself The General Command.  This General Command would consist of 38 total 
members, six apiece from each of the three linked zones and ten each from the two 
remaining zones.  This led to a structure that was inordinately stacked against the more 
independent and increasingly dissident unified group.  Beyond this, the General 
Command would still serve under the previous Supreme Council of the ELF, which 
remained in the hands of the previously unsupportive leadership.  While this arrangement 
temporarily re-established the ELF as a politically united force under its central 
leadership, it remained an untenable structure.  The three unified zones continued to 
chafe under the current leadership and the often conservative directions it was taking the 
organization.  By 1970 the General Command erupted into violence, with 6 members of 
the Command itself being jailed and over 300 guerrilla fighters being executed.  The 
progressive and dissident elements of the ELF, already dissatisfied with the politics, 
strategy, and leadership of the Supreme Council, began to splinter off and slowly 
coalesced into the second major combatant group of the war, the Eritrean Peoples’ 
Liberation Front.   
 This split of the armed forces would not be the last but was certainly the most 
important of the conflict.  The literature since the independence of Eritrea has followed 
various paths to analyze the reasons behind the divergent characters of the ELF and the 
EPLF, covering aspects of religions, ethnicity, class, even economic backgrounds of the 
various member groups, but perhaps the simplest explanation is that of a rising tide of 
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student recruits in the late 1960s brought with them newer radical ideas that had been 
absent in the earlier leadership of the ELF.  These progressive philosophies were brought 
to the fore as these students assumed leadership positions and participated in overseas 
training courses in such revolutionary countries as Cuba and China.  By 1970 the rising 
ambitions of these younger aspiring leaders and the faltering grip of the older 
conservative leadership simply could no longer coexist and the split occurred.  The ELF 
remained a fiercely nationalist but loosely disciplined group of guerrillas and older 
intellectuals while the EPLF took a more rigorously revolutionary tack and began 
organizing a disciplined peasant base from which to grow its infrastructure.  Despite their 
shared goals of Eritrean liberation, the two fronts immediately found themselves in 
military conflict, leading to a weakening of both sides as well as a reduction of sabotage, 
ambushes, and guerrilla strikes on the Ethiopian forces in Eritrea.  The Ethiopian army 
launched a strong ground offensive in late 1970 that battered the ELF regions and 
followed this with a vigorous bombing campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force.18  
Although neither of these proved decisive, they enhanced Ethiopian control over the 
regions and allowed for the building of further infrastructure to maintain that hold, such 
as a series of roads in Western Eritrea that increased the Ethiopian influence near the 
Sudanese border, a vital gateway for the ELF’s arms and food.   
 Despite the military setbacks for both nationalist movements embodied in both 
the Ethiopian offensives and their own Civil War, the early 1970s would prove to be 
fruitful for the nationalist movements.  The Ethiopian forces treated the “pacified” 
regions of Eritrea like occupied territory of blood enemies and committed numerous 
                                                 
18  DeWaal, Evil Days does an excellent job discussing the prevalence of these blunt tactics of 
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atrocities and indignities upon the Eritrean populace.  Villagization schemes were 
attempted to cut back on guerrilla support without adequate food supplies or sanitary 
considerations.19  Livestock and crops were simply seized.  Entire populations saw their 
homes burnt to the ground.  This had the obvious effect of inciting the populace against 
Haile Selassie’s troops and caused a resurgence in membership in both liberation fronts.   
The war continued to be fought in the countryside and the cities, with fighters of the ELF 
and EPLF striking numerous targets during hit and run raids.  Both nationalist fronts were 
showing an increased sophistication in their strategy and tactics and were slowly building 
their constituencies in both urban and rural settings.  While neither front was charitably 
inclined towards its rival, signs were pointing to a détente between the two that would 
allow for a greater degree of organization in their activities.  However, while the war 
ground interminably on, events were unfolding in Ethiopia which would alter the war in 
ways that neither front could be prepared for. 
 In 1974 Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Lion of Judah, the Elect of God, who had 
been Emperor of Ethiopia since 1930 was overthrown in a popular coup, arrested, and 
later killed by his military forces, which subsequently took control of his Empire.  The 
group behind this, the Derg,20 was a loose council of 120 military officers that saw 
themselves as enlightened technocrats that could navigate Ethiopia through its current 
crises and restore its power and prestige.  Although nominally headed by General Anam 
Andom, the committee was the site of several vicious behind the scenes struggles for 
                                                                                                                                                 
populace sweeps and random bombing. 
19  Villagization is a common counterinsurgency strategy used since the days of the Boer War or 
even before.  It consists of the forced removal of the populace to fortified and controlled villages to both 
protect them from and limit their contact with the insurgents, thereby cutting off the enemy guerrillas from 
any popular support.  It generally emerged into the popular consciousness during the Vietnam War, but in 
that conflict as in most others the actual effects of the strategy are debatable. 
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power which ended with a former Major in the Ethiopian Army, Mengistu Haile Mariam 
as the main wellspring of power in the nation.  General Andom was executed in 
November of 1974 and Mengistu assumed one of the two chairs of the Derg which he 
would dominate for the next 17 years.  However, the upshot of this activity was that the 
already over-extended Ethiopian military was thrown into general disarray.  During the 
course of the yearlong confusion, the two Eritrean nationalist fronts continued their slow 
rapprochement and patched together a ceasefire in October,21 leaving both organizations 
free to focus on both fighting the disorganized Ethiopians as well as reaching out to the 
numerous new dissident groups which sprang up in the confusion and bloodshed 
following the Derg’s coup.   
 The next four years would prove crucial to the eventual success of Eritrean 
nationalism.  The backlash against the growing excesses of the Derg (which shortly 
blossomed into what became known as a “Red Terror” as thousands of Ethiopians and 
Eritreans were summarily executed or imprisoned and tortured) drove massive amounts 
of recruits into the guerrillas’ camps and opened new opportunities for alliance with other 
revolutionary groups such as the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).22  The ELF 
consolidated its control in Western Eritrea and grew its numbers of both trained fighters 
and militia.  The EPLF used this period to establish several “liberated zones” where an 
astonishing amount of social programs were established, from land reform to literacy 
                                                                                                                                                 
20  Derg is the Amharic word for “Committee” and was the name taken by the new regime. 
21  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 46.  This temporarily ended what has been known 
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programs to gender liberation.  Both fronts continued their harassment of Ethiopian 
forces and slowly began to drive them out of the Eritrean borders as best they could.  In 
early 1975 the Eritrean fronts launched an attack on Asmara itself, which although it was 
beaten back set off an orgy of violence by the Ethiopian troops directed at the city itself, 
further alienating the urban populace.  The military success of both fronts continued with 
the defeat of the incomparably inept “Peasants’ Crusade” set up by Mengistu’s 
government in 1976, where 50,000 ill-equipped and untrained Ethiopian peasants were 
unleashed upon Eritrea with promises of conquered land.  These forces were casually 
picked apart by veteran fighters of both Eritrean fronts and the TPLF with few if any 
peasants actually ever setting foot in Eritrea.    
 1977 saw continued confidence on the part of both Liberation Fronts.  Early in the 
year the EPLF captured Nacfa and Afabet, two major trading centers on the northern 
Sahel province of Eritrea.  These conquests were followed by Decamare and Keren, both 
important industrial centers.  Beyond this, Keren was a natural fortress that commanded 
the passes to that gave the easiest access to the Sudan, which continued to be both a 
humanitarian and logistic base for the Eritrean struggle.  In the same period of time, the 
ELF captured the town of Tessenei and followed this feat with its liberation of Agordat, 
Adi Quala, and Mondefera.  These successes reduced the Ethiopian presence to several 
isolated garrisons and the important cities of Asmara, Massawa, and Barentu.  Massawa 
was particularly important as it was the primary port for Eritrea and was therefore a 
primary entry point for the food and weapons that the Ethiopian forces needed to keep 
their flagging cause alive.  The EPLF managed to cut the road between Asmara, the 
capital, and Massawa, the primary port, in October of 1977 and the end of Ethiopian 
 17
resistance to Eritrean nationalism appeared to be in sight.  With Mengistu’s Ethiopia 
caught between the Liberation fronts in the North and a brutal war with Said Barre’s 
Somalia in the West over the Ogaden territories,23 it seemed impossible that the state 
could last much longer. 
 It was at this point that an astonishing international realignment altered the 
balance of in Ethiopia once again.  Mengistu’s Ethiopia had already claimed itself as a 
Marxist republic since shortly after its inception, although this had always been taken as 
at best a philosophical stopgap for what was essentially an ideologically empty revolt and 
coup.  However, by 1977 the ailing Ethiopia continued to declare its devotion to Marxist 
ideals and had completed an arms agreement with the Soviet Union.  This new arms 
agreement alongside the belated recognition of the human rights violations of the Derg 
regime caused President Carter and the United States Congress to deny any further 
military support to Mengistu’s Ethiopia.  Sensing an opportunity for a greater presence in 
the Horn, the Soviet Union immediately filled the military vacuum in Ethiopia, 
consequently abandoning its current proxy of Somalia.  By July over $500 million worth 
of Soviet Arms flooded into Ethiopia, dwarfing the previous United States aid.24  
Beyond the military hardware, which included everything from MiG-21 fighters and 
SAM-7 anti-aircraft rockets, military personnel from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact 
nations, Cuba, the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Libya arrived to bolster 
and train the Ethiopian Army.25  During the Siege of Massawa it was reported that 
                                                 
23  The Ogaden War began in 1977 with Somalia invading the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to support 
the irredentist claims of the ethnic Somalis living in the region. 
24  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 90.  This section also deals with the wide array of 
weaponry involved in the transaction. 
25  Ibid., 90-91. 
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Soviet advisors took a direct part in the fighting against the Eritreans and even that 
Russian Naval vessels provided shore bombardment to help drive away the EPLF 
advance.26  Cuban troops served openly in the Ogaden War, helping halt their recently 
abandoned Somali allies and aiding in their eventual defeat over the next year. 
 This massive aid continued, with 1978 shipments of advanced arms raising the 
total price of material aid to over $1 billion.27  Tanks, Katyusha rocket batteries, MiG 
fighters, and long range artillery all were provided along with the expertise to effectively 
use them.  Small arms were provided in almost obscene amounts as the Ethiopian army 
rose like a phoenix from its past four years of defeats.  This staggering amount of military 
aid could only have one effect on the Eritrean struggle: strategic stalemate and eventual 
losses.  As mentioned in passing previously, the EPLF had made a bold strike at 
Massawa in late 1977, driving the Ethiopian troops from the city to the fortified Naval 
Base and two small islands off shore.  However, this was to be the high water mark of the 
liberation struggle for the next seven years as the EPLF could not complete their control 
of the city and were then left to face the counteroffensive of the resurgent Eastern-bloc 
backed Ethiopian Army which was able to focus its energies on Eritrea following their 
victory in the Ogaden in 1978.     
 The Ethiopian counter-offensives of 1978-1979 were not tactically or strategically 
brilliant, but they were supported by massive amounts of men and material that even the 
combined forces of the liberation fronts were dwarfed by their power.  By June 21st of 
1978 there were reportedly 70,000 Ethiopian troops massed in Tigray preparing for the 
                                                 
26  Connell, Against All Odds, 154.  However, this direct ground intervention seems to have been 
more due to the recent arrival of the weaponry and subsequent Ethiopian unfamiliarity with it.  As to the 
naval bombardment, it remains a pervasive but unsubstantiated rumor. 
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upcoming offensive and by July those number had risen to over 100,000, which if they 
were not superbly trained were at least equipped with new and effective material.28  By 
mid July the offensive was underway with multiple spearheads of Ethiopian armor and 
troops penetrating Tigray and Southwestern Eritrea, with the heaviest blows landing on 
the ELF areas.  By July 21st the ELF had been driven from the majority of their captured 
cities and towns in the western lowlands and the central highlands, exposing the western 
edge of the EPLF domains.  Offensives also begin from the Ethiopian garrisons of 
Massawa and Asmara, further sowing confusion and battering the overstretched Eritrean 
forces.  The responses of the liberation fronts took different forms: the ELF attempted to 
hold its ground against the Ethiopian steamroller while the EPLF announced several 
“tactical withdrawals” in the process abandoning recent gains around such cities as 
Decamare and Massawa.29  The end results also differed: in their attempt to hold their 
ground against the massed Ethiopian forces the ELF inflicted great casualties against 
them but also sealed their own fate.  Already battered by years of warfare (both internal 
and external) and having been waning in prestige in comparison to the more radical and 
organized EPLF, the ELF were essentially broken as a military force following the 
Ethiopian attacks of the late 1970s and its remaining forces were slowly absorbed into the 
EPLF over the next several years.  The EPLF in withdrawing lost a great amount of 
territory and also had to abandon many carefully cultivated base areas, but escaped 
complete destruction and instead re-entrenched themselves in Keren and the Sahel region 
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of the Northwest which continued to serve as safe liberated base areas for the Eritreans to 
draw logistical strength from. 
 Of course, this had only been the first counter-offensive of the Ethiopian forces.  
The second round directed at the EPLF stronghold of Keren began in November of 
1978.30  Featuring vicious struggles between veteran EPLF guerrillas and heavily 
armored Ethiopian columns, the second offensive again showcased the military skill of 
the EPLF in inflicting horrific casualties against the Ethiopian forces, but the disparity in 
men and material remained too great.  This is not to say the Ethiopians simply came on in 
waves; since the influx of advisors and material, their tactics had evolved and by using 
multiple columns of armor and by advancing along several parallel paths, they forced the 
EPLF to spread their already meager forces thinner, exacerbating the disparity in number.  
These new tactics had their effect and on November 26th the EPLF forces abandoned 
Keren and fell back on their base areas around Nacfa and in the mountains of the Sahel, 
their last safe haven in the country.  It was to prove an especially effective one however, 
with the mountainous terrain and prepared logistical and defensive positions serving the 
Eritreans very well in the months to come. 
 1979 and 1980 saw the Eritrean forces at bay but certainly not defeated.  
Ethiopian forces launched their third, fourth, and fifth offensives in 1979 against the 
Eritrean forces and achieved nothing against the prepared and veteran EPLF.  These 
strikes contained over 50,000 Ethiopian troops supported by massive amounts of armor 
and artillery and yet were unable to make any measurable headway against the base areas 
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of the EPLF.31  In 8 days between July 14th and 22nd the Ethiopian army lost 
approximately 6,000 men.  Indiscriminate bombing against the base regions was resumed 
but caused little damage as the Eritrean workshops, schools, and hospitals were generally 
either well camouflaged or subterranean by this point in the war.  1980 saw a general 
stalemate on the front while the army continued to “pacify” its reclaimed regions of 
Eritrea.  These efforts saw the return of numerous human rights violations and often 
indiscriminate violence, especially against the restructured villages that the EPLF had 
created in their previous zones of control.  However, due to the popularity of the EPLF 
social programs which had been established, this harsh treatment simply continued the 
alienation of the Eritrean populace and allowed the EPLF guerrilla activities to continue 
almost unhindered behind Ethiopian lines.   
 The last major event of 1980 was the final destruction of the ELF.  While its 
military forces had been essentially broken in the fighting and retreats of 1978-79, the 
last guerrilla vestiges still existed in the very Western reaches of Eritrea near the Sudan 
border.  With their strength almost gone and yet still standing astride the vital lifeline to 
food relief shipments, the EPLF finally decided that the ELF was more of a hindrance 
than a help to their continued struggle.  A brief conflict ensued where the EPLF, aided by 
their erstwhile allies in the TPLF, finally drove the remnants of the ELF into the Sudan 
where they would serve no further role in the conflict.32  As such, there now officially 
remained only one dominant Eritrean nationalist force carrying on the struggle, but it was 
one that had withstood years of civil and external war and had established itself as the 
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more revolutionary and pragmatic of the two.  By 1982 its strength would again be put to 
the test against the massive Ethiopian “Red Star” offensive. 
 The personnel gathered for the “Red Star” campaign (so named by Mengistu as a 
play off of the contemporary “Bright Star” US exercises in the Mid-East) were the largest 
seen so far in the conflict.  The total military strength for Ethiopia at this point stood at 
245,000, by far the largest army in Africa.  The offensive itself saw 120,000 troops 
deployed against the Eritrean forces, although most of these were conscript troops with 
little training and who were mostly used for massive blunt assaults against the EPLF 
positions.33  As such, although they outnumbered their Eritrean opponents by eight to 
one, the assaults often ended in bloody repulses and by the end of the campaign over 
40,000 of these Ethiopian conscripts would be casualties.  By May 1982 it had not even 
captured Nacfa and in June the Ethiopian armed forces ceased operations.  Despite it 
being their largest campaign to date, the Ethiopians still could not dislodge the Eritreans.  
With the failure of the “Red Star” campaign and its small follow up “Stealth Offensive” 
of 1983, the strategic initiative returned to the battered Eritrean forces and they began to 
hesitatingly advance against the spent Ethiopian forces in 1984.  Although the Ethiopian 
forces continued to expand (topping 340,000 men in total in 1983 alone) and launched 
several counter-offensives in 1984 and 1985, they would never come so close to winning 
the war again.  The 1985 offensive was the largest yet and drove the Eritreans back from 
their recent gains with their largest losses to date (approximately 2,000-4,000 personnel 
killed and wounded) this was primarily due to their switch from guerrilla to mobile 
warfare (which will be covered later in this chapter).  The Eritrean repulse of the 1984-
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1985 offensives saw the EPLF consolidate their hold on their western liberated zones and 
grow their forces from approximately 12,000 formal fighters to 30,000 by 1987 when 
their major counter-offensives began.34   Drawing strength from their liberated areas and 
transforming the villages and cities they captured, the EPLF drove the Ethiopian forces 
back step by step and used their extremely effective social and relief organizations to help 
mitigate the effects of the massive famine that had been underway since the early 1980s.  
The mobile warfare phase of the EPLF finally drew the Ethiopian forces into a decisive 
battle at Afabet on March 17th, 1988 and over the next two days proceeded to annihilate 
the Ethiopian Northern Command.35  Over 15,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed and 
massive amounts of small arms, artillery, tanks, and ammunition fell into the hands of the 
ever-stronger EPLF.36  Although the Ethiopian forces still existed in strength throughout 
Eritrea and would continue to struggle against the Eritrea liberation, they would never 
pose an adequate threat against the Eritreans after Afabet and were, despite their size and 
equipment, a broken force.  In February of 1990 Massawa fell to a rapid advance of the 
EPLF forces, who this time conquered the island bases with a small flotilla of rubber 
craft.  By February and March of 1991 Asmara fell to EPLF siege and the remainders of 
the Ethiopian garrisons of Asmara and Keren attempted to retreat to the Sudan and the 
vast majority of the combined force was captured in route.  The struggle in Eritrea was 
essentially over, but one last act remained.  
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 In January of 1989 the TPLF had joined with a number of other ethnic liberation 
fronts in Ethiopia to form the combined Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPDRF).  As the most veteran of all the organizations, the TPLF took the lead in 
the organization and by February of 1989 had driven the Ethiopian army completely from 
Tigray.  Although relations had ruptured between the EPLF and TPLF in 1985, they had 
been restored during the successes of 1988 and as such the EPLF had sent a detachment 
to aid in the final liberation of Tigray and beyond.37  Working side by side with the 
EPDRF from 1989 on, the combined force held Tigray and built its strength until 
February 1991.  From February on the EPDRF launched a series of offensives including 
“Operation Teodros,” “Operation Dula Billisuma Welkita” (Oromo for “Equality and 
Freedom Campaign”), and finally “Operation Wallelign” which finally brought an end to 
Mengistu’s Ethiopian regime when the dictator fled on May 21st, 1991.38  This 
effectively ended Ethiopian resistance and brought the TPLF-led coalition to power in 
Ethiopia.  One of its first acts was to keep its previous promise to the EPLF and sponsor a 
resolution in the United Nations for the recognition of Eritrea as its own sovereign state.  
The thirty year struggle for Eritrean liberation was over and following a 1993 
referendum, Eritrea joined the world as the only successful secession on African soil.
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Chapter 2.  Reasons for Success 
 
 Of course, the first major question that must spring to mind is why was this 
secession of all attempts successful?  It did not have the foreign aid or international 
uncertainty that Katanga had in its attempt.  It did not have the humanitarian outcry of 
Biafra.  The same factors that doomed all previous attempts and have since hobbled all 
followed attempted secessions applied to Eritrea: a lack on international recognition, a 
limited supply of arms, a finite and tenuous resource base, and an international consensus 
against the feared ‘Balkanization’ of African states.  So what was it about the Eritrean 
case that allowed its anomalous success?  What factors has the Eritrean conflict (and the 
EPLF in particular) had that set is apart from all the others so far and since?  The answer 
is a tight combination of four interwoven factors that allowed Eritrea to achieve its 
successes and that any other secession has so far failed to attain.  These four factors are 
its unique historical development and the effects this had on the framing of the conflict, 
the brilliant and ultimately successful application of the Maoist concept of Protracted 
War, the simultaneous social revolution undertaken by the victorious party and its 
ultimate effect of forging a national identity, and lastly the pragmatic and decisive 
relations the EPLF constructed with the reform insurgencies going on in Ethiopia at the 
time of their revolt. 
 
Chapter 2.1.  Anomalous History 
 
 To deal with these factors in order, the first is the anomalous history of Eritrea in 
terms of its relations with Ethiopia.  The historical basis of secessions has always been 
seen as a necessary factor within the conflicts to separate a body politic from its host 
state.  Katanga argued for its independence from the Congo based on its previous 
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separate administration during the colonial era under the Comite Special du Katanga.  
Biafra pointed to the historically separate administrations for each Nigerian region as 
well as their political separation from the North prior to 1914 as both the grounds for a 
confederal solution and their own secession.  For Eritrea their history with Ethiopia 
allowed for an even stronger and perhaps more effective argument.  Although Ethiopia 
argued that Eritrea was their 14th province and was historically part of the Ethiopian 
empire, Eritrea could, would, and did maintain that their history not only placed them 
well outside the Ethiopian sphere of influence but that also their development during the 
colonial period culturally and socially severed whatever historical ties may originally 
have been extant. 
 To begin with the history of Eritrea, the earliest connections that can be made to 
Ethiopia were to the Axumite kingdoms of the inland plateaus.  The Axumite expansion 
introduced Coptic Christianity to the highland plateaus that would form the heartland of 
both Ethiopia and Eritrea by the 4th century CE.39  These kingdoms waxed powerful and 
even exerted a small amount of influence into the Muslim and animist nomadic herdsman 
that lived along the coastal plains by the Red Sea.  However, these early links were 
severed permanently by the Muslim expansion of the 6th and 7th centuries BCE.40  By 
approximately 750 the Muslim influence had driven the power of the Axumite kingdoms 
and their Coptic faith from the both the coastal lowlands and the Sudan.  This spread of 
Islamic strength helped the nascent Beja kingdoms coalesce and they quickly expanded 
their own influence onto the central plateau region.  This essentially severed the ancient 
“Ethiopian” control over whatever regions might now constitute Eritrea.  In the 14th and 
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15th century the Ethiopians themselves had become sufficiently centralized and strong to 
challenge the Muslim Kingdoms again and retook the Central highlands, a period which 
marked increased Christian influence and the transition in the region from pastoralist 
cultures into agricultural.  However, control of the lowlands still eluded the Ethiopians 
and these plains would continue to serve as both an alien region and a staging ground for 
invaders for the next five centuries.41  Throughout the 16th century the various Islamic 
empires of the region, specifically the Turks, would give military aid to the Muslim 
coastal groups, leading to a contested existence for the fertile plateaus.  By the end of the 
century a variety of sources referred to the region encompassing the coastal plains and the 
central plateau region as Medhi Bahri and viewed this nascent Eritrea as politically and 
culturally separate from Ethiopia.42  In fact, from Eritrea’s growth as a regional power to 
its sublimation to the Egypt of Mohammed Ali and his successors from 1823 to its 
eventual fate as an Italian colony, Ethiopia could only claim partial control of the region 
for a period of 9 years between 1880 and 1889.   
 Even following this partial control, in 1889 the Italians claimed full sovereign 
rights to the territory as stipulated first in its recognition by the other European powers at 
the Berlin Conference of 1885 and later by Ethiopia itself in the treaty of Uccialli in 
1889.  Admittedly the treaty of Uccialli is and remains a controversial document.  While 
the Amharic translation signed by Menelik II was written as saying that the Ethiopians 
“might” use Italy as intermediaries to the rest of Europe, the Italian version essentially 
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suborned Ethiopian foreign policy to Italy.43  However, despite this argument of 
interpretation, the treaty still clearly demarcated the boundaries of Eritrea and recognized 
the Italian sphere of influence over the Medri Bahri.   Tellingly, even after the destruction 
of the Italian army at Adowa in 1896, Menelik did not conquer Eritrea as an Ethiopian 
possession.  Instead the Treaty of Addis Ababa (signed October 23rd, 1896) reaffirmed 
Italian hegemony over an expanded Eritrea.44  From this time until their defeat in 1941, 
the Italians occupation would serve to physically and culturally develop Eritrea as a 
separate and distinct entity far different than the feudal empire that Ethiopia remained. 
 Italian development played a decisive part in the creation of Eritrea.  While 
admittedly the Eritreans themselves were seen as second class subjects, the development 
of the Eritrean colony would have far ranging changes to their culture and society.  The 
displacement of previous notables in favor of Italian elites was perhaps the first major 
change, altering the traditional power structure of the region.45  Mass plantation farming 
and wage labor was introduced, with large farms producing cotton, fruit, sisal, and coffee 
were set up and large numbers of Eritreans were recruited to work these fields to grow 
and harvest the produce for Italian consumption.46  Mining was also introduced and 
continually expanded to produce the raw materials that the developing Italian state 
needed.  Gold, iron, nickel, chromium, and other minerals were found and an effort was 
made to increase the exploitation of Eritrea’s mineral wealth all the way into 1930s and 
40s.47  To help support this labor and develop other forms of it for their benefit, the 
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Italians introduced improved medical and veterinary practices.  In addition they instituted 
secular education for young men up to the fourth grade.  The introduction of heavier 
industries and economic development also meant an expansion of infrastructure to take 
full advantage of the growing economy.  A railway was built between Massawa, Asmara, 
and Agordat in 1922.  An intricate network of all-weather roads was completed in 1935, 
primarily to aid in the military mobilization taking place in the colony.  Telephone and 
telegram lines were laid and later in the colony’s history airports were built to connect the 
burgeoning cities to the rest of the Italian Empire.   Even the cities were expanded, as row 
houses were built to house the workers of over 300 small scale workshops and industries 
around the major urban centers of Massawa, Asmara, and Assab, where increasing 
numbers of young Eritreans moved to earn wages to pay the new taxes being levied on 
them.48  By 1935, the year that thousands of Eritrean soldiers invaded Ethiopia along 
with their Italian colonists, Eritrea no longer resembled its highland neighbor socially, 
economically, or culturally. 
 From 1936 to 1941, Ethiopia and Eritrea were briefly linked, but this was under 
the domination of Benito Mussolini’s fascist military forces following the driving of 
Haile Selassie from his kingdom.  This five year period saw Eritrea continually used as a 
logistical base for the further expansion of the Italian Empire in East Africa, an Empire 
that would be contemptuously dismantled by the British East African forces in 1941.  
While Ethiopia was handed back to Haile Selassie, Eritrea remained under the rule of a 
British military commission, which continued to use it as a light industrial center for the 
war effort in the region.  The United States used the former colony as a shipping depot 
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for its regional shipping and even constructed an airplane assembly plant at Gura.  Britain 
leaned even more heavily upon the former colony, using its facilities to create trade 
goods for markets cut off by the closure of the Suez Canal.  The Eritrean economy 
experienced a boom as they produced soap, matches, hand tools, beer, wine, and paper 
for regional trade.   Simultaneously, Eritrean social structures were experiencing an 
“Eritreanization” under British auspices.  Lesser administrative positions were opened to 
the Eritreans and the color bar was slowly lowered on a variety of social functions.  
Education was again revitalized and Arabic, Tigrinya, and English were taught in over 60 
schools.49  Public health services again became available and the colony continued its 
modernization. 
 Following the war the boom dried up, but the social and cultural changes 
remained.  However, there remained the sticky question of what must be done with 
Eritrea.  The outcome of this question has already been dealt with at the beginning of this 
narrative, but the import of it to both sides remains the key issue here.  While Ethiopia 
can and did point towards the earnest desire of large swathes of Eritrean society that did 
indeed wish for Union with Ethiopia, those who dissented had a powerful argument 
against Union and one that they continued to use to support the cause of secession.  That 
argument was a simple one: at no point could Ethiopia point towards a historic 
connection between the two nations, at least not one that was of recent enough vintage to 
truly matter.  Even the brief periods of late 19th century influence were themselves either 
not indicative of any formal connection or, as in the terms of the Treaty of Uccialli, 
formally renounced under international law.  Furthermore, the Eritreans could and did 
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argue that their separate evolution both socially and culturally in the decades of 
colonialism certainly put themselves outside any Ethiopian state that existed throughout 
those decades.  Whereas Ethiopia remained a largely feudal agricultural state that was run 
by a small aristocracy living off of masses of downtrodden peasants, Eritrea was a semi-
industrialized state with light industry, cash crop plantations, wage labor, and a 
flourishing administrative system including a burgeoning political system made up of 
educated elites.  As such, any claimed “Union” between the two, whether it was historical 
or present, was spurious at best. 
 As such, following the forced federation of the two states in 1952 and especially 
following the dissolution of the Eritrean federal assembly in 1962, the Eritrean opposition 
did not see themselves as a movement of a political body separating itself from a host 
nation.  Instead they saw themselves as engaged in a decolonization struggle against an 
African colonizer.  This can be seen in a variety of literature, press statements, and even 
within the language used by the fronts themselves.  Every group to emerge was a 
liberation front with nationalist goals to free their nation from the control of an 
oppressive outside invader.  The Eritreans would constantly make this argument 
throughout their struggle and made every effort to frame it as such.  This was an 
important point for a very specific reason: as shown by the example of every secession 
struggle previous to that of Eritrea, the Organization of African Unity and the United 
Nations would brook no successful secession for fear of a domino effect and the 
balkanization of Africa.50  Simply put, no international recognition could be expected 
and no international aid could be sought by a secessionist group.  In fact, it would be far 
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more likely to attract outright hostility and support for the host nation, in this case 
Ethiopia.51  However, with the Eritrean struggle cast as one of decolonization, a whole 
new world of possibilities opened up.  In terms of the OAU, which dominated any 
discussions of international interest on the continent, Decolonization struggles were 
sacrosanct.  Article II of the OAU charter proclaimed that one of the primary purposes of 
the organization was “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa” and Article III, 
while serving as an insurmountable barrier to secession, declared “absolute dedication to 
the emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent” as one of the core 
principles of the Union.52  As such, by casting their struggle as one of decolonization, 
the Eritreans avoided one of the key hurdles to every previous and following Secession 
attempt on the continent of Africa.  This is not to say that the OAU immediately 
recognized its struggle and threw its weight behind their efforts (having just read a brief 
history of the struggle, this must be obvious), but it did allow for legal wiggle room on 
what had been an airtight condemnation of any separation of African states, something 
that would have been doubly difficult in one of the most venerated states of the continent. 
 
Chapter 2.2.  Eritrea and Protracted War 
 
 Of course, the international legality of the secession/liberation would have been 
moot if the conflict waged to affect it had been crushed.  Katanga and Biafra could argue 
their cases all they wished, but at the end of the day their states were overrun by enemy 
                                                 
51  The fact that Ethiopia was the host nation in fact made things more complex both for external 
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multi-ethnic composition of the state would cause problems in the philosophical relations between the 
Eritrean fronts and those housed in Ethiopia. 
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forces and their leadership was forced to declare an end to the separation.  In comparison, 
the military campaign for the future of Eritrea was brilliantly successful.  Eritrea stands 
out even among other secession and liberation attempts for being an exceptionally 
successful application of the military dictums of Mao’s theory of protracted warfare, a 
theoretical construct which served the purposes of Eritrea extremely well with only slight 
modifications.  In this, Eritrea’s success resembled nothing so much as the previous anti-
colonial struggles of both China (Against both the Koumintang government and the 
Japanese, 1929-1949) and Vietnam (Against both the Japanese and the French, 1941-
1954).  Their application of this theory cannot be especially surprising, given that 
contemporary African liberation fronts were taking advantage of it (most notably Amilcar 
Cabral’s PAIGC against the Portuguese) and that many early figures in the EPLF 
leadership had received military training in China during their tenure in the ELF.53  
What is astonishing is the extremely clear application of these theories and their 
remarkable effectiveness on the Ethiopian enemy. 
 Mao laid out his military philosophy in a series of lectures presented over the 
period of the Chinese Civil War and the Sino-Japanese war of 1936-1945.  Noting that 
the Communist Chinese forces were weak in comparison to both the Koumintang (KMT) 
of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Army of Imperial Japan, he laid out the strategic vision 
necessary to effectively prosecute the conflict against these enemies for the ultimate 
victory of his revolutionary forces.  Perhaps central to the military canon of Mao is his 
work “On Protracted War,” which lays out the three stages that a revolutionary army 
must pass through during its protracted struggle with a superior enemy.  The first is the 
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period of Strategic Defense.54  It is a given that the revolutionary forces will be smaller, 
worse supplied, and unable to resist the counter-revolutionary forces in the early stages of 
a conflict.  The ability of a centrally-organized and legitimate opponent to both generate 
its own support and gain outside aid will always outweigh that of a revolution in a semi-
feudal nation to begin with.  As such, this early stage must of necessity be one of defense 
and retreat.  The primary course of action for the revolutionary front must be that of 
survival while extending the enemy further and depleting his strength.  For Mao this was 
easy given the vast distances involved in China- for other combatants other methods 
would have to be applied as will be seen in the following analysis.55  As the enemy 
reached the terminal edge of his operational distance and the threat of imminent 
annihilation passed, the revolutionaries could transition into the second phase. 
 The second phase as delineated by Mao was the Strategic Stalemate.56  This 
occurred when then enemy had extended himself to his current limit but the 
revolutionaries were not yet strong enough to take the initiative.  In this phase the 
revolutionaries then had two primary goals: the prosecution of guerrilla warfare and the 
mobilization of the populace.  In terms of the prosecution of the guerrilla war, it was 
assumed that it would still be impossible to combat the counter-revolutionary forces 
directly, but yet it was necessary to continue to reduce his strength to both safeguard the 
revolution and create the factors necessary to transition to the third phase.  As such, the 
countryside would become the home of guerrilla bands, sent to harass and damage the 
                                                                                                                                                 
53  Connell, Against All Odds, 80 and 144. 
54  Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War” in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, ed. M. Rejai 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 275. 
55  Strategically this difference would also be shown in the Cuban Revolution, where lacking 
distances the revolutionaries became dependent upon the difficult terrain of the Sierra Maestre Mountains. 
56  Ibid., 276. 
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enemy’s extended supply lines and communications.  The counter-revolutionary’s food 
and ammunition were to be hijacked or destroyed, his ability to transmit information 
disrupted, and his security outside of areas of concentrated strength was to be 
compromised as much as possible.  A simultaneous objective was the mobilization of the 
populace, which was to take place in several safeguarded base areas.  These areas, made 
secure by remote location, strong defenses, or secrecy, were to serve as centers of 
production, education, and social transformation.  By offering a strong alternative to the 
current unpopular counterrevolutionary government, these base areas would grow the 
strength of the revolution by mobilizing the populace to either directly serve the 
revolution as fighters or indirectly serve it by producing the logistical necessities for the 
prosecution of the conflict.  Thus, during the second phase a process of the simultaneous 
weakening of the enemy and strengthening of the revolutionaries would take place until 
such time that the balance of power had firmly tipped in the favor of the revolution, when 
the final stage of the protracted conflict would begin. 
 This final stage was that of the Strategic Offensive.57   Having weakened the 
enemy, harassed his communications, taken the security of the countryside from him, and 
mobilized and organized their own strength in terms of both quality and quantity of 
forces, the revolution could now transition from its combination of guerrilla and 
defensive warfare to one of guerrilla and offensive mobile warfare.  While the guerrillas 
could continue to exist and pursue their missions throughout the countryside, the main 
force of the revolution would now fight in mobile conventional formations, seeking to 
stalk, confront, and destroy the now inferior counter-revolutionary forces.  The entire 
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purpose of the transition to mobile warfare was to use the greater agility of the 
revolutionary forces (who were not hampered by the great distances of communication or 
a hostile countryside) to concentrate an insurmountable force against the isolated enemy 
formations and force a decisive confrontation that would see the destruction of the 
opponent.  With this achieved, it was simply necessary to repeat the process in the 
strategic offensive until such time that all enemy formations were destroyed or driven 
from the revolutionary state.  This would conclude hostilities and secure peace on the 
terms of the revolutionary front. 
 A key concept within this theory of Protracted Conflict (and one which we will 
see was decisive in terms of the Eritrean case), was Mao’s enunciation and acceptance of 
the Strategic Retreat.  While this was implicit in “On Protracted War,” he more fully 
delineated the concept in his earlier lecture “Problems of Strategy in China’s 
Revolutionary War” where he began his exploration with the pronouncement “The 
objective of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the 
counteroffensive.  Retreat is necessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a 
strong enemy means to jeopardize the preservation of one’s own forces.”58  This 
strategic retreat would follow a number of strategic precepts to ensure the maximum 
benefit was to be gained even as the forces pulled back from a superior enemy.  The first 
precept was that the retreat should always take advantage of prepared interior lines to 
safely fall back on prepared base areas from with the revolutionary forces could derive 
strength.  The second was that the retreat should always be undertaken unless at least two 
of the following conditions could be met if not more: the active support of the populace 
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for the revolutionaries, the terrain was favorable for operations, all of the main 
revolutionary forces were concentrated, the enemy’s weak spots had been discovered, the 
enemy had been reduced to a tired and demoralized state, or the enemy had been induced 
to make mistakes.  When two of these conditions had been met, it would signal the 
opportunity to switch from the strategic withdrawal to the offensive yet again.59  
However, it must always be remembered that Mao intended the strategic retreat to create 
these favorable advantages and as such it served to both preserve the revolutionary forces 
and create the advantages that would allow their future success. 
 Finally, underpinning all of these concepts was Mao’s stated Principles of 
Operation as enunciated in his lecture “The Present Situation and Our Tasks.”60  These 
were a list of 10 operational concepts that would serve as the philosophical basis for the 
greater strategic thinking of the Protracted War.  The first was to attack dispersed and 
isolated enemies first, leaving concentrated enemy strongpoints for later operations.  The 
second instructed the revolutionaries to occupy large rural areas and small and medium 
cities first, leaving large urban areas for later.  The third directed the combatants to focus 
their efforts on the reduction and demolition of their opponent’s effective strength before 
all other things; when the enemy’s strength had been broken, cities, towns, and other 
strategic areas would fall far easier.  The fourth exhorted the revolutionary forces to only 
fight when absolute numerical superiority was on their side (at least double their 
opponent’s strength) and then when fighting to seek to encircle and annihilate their foe- 
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59  Ibid., 280. 
60  Mao Tse-Tung, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks” in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, 
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use their numbers and mobility to complete dismantle their enemy and avoid costly 
battles of attrition.  The fifth instructs to fight no battle unprepared and without absolute 
surety of victory.  The sixth instructs the combatants to be selfless in combat and ignore 
fear of sacrifice and fatigue and be accepting of the necessity of fighting several 
successive battles.  The seventh dictates the advantage of using mobile warfare to 
overcome the enemy but not to neglect positional tactics when reducing the enemy’s 
fixed points.  The eighth commands the revolutionary front to resolutely size all strong 
points if a city must be attacked, taking care to use timing and aggression to overcome 
fixed strong points and waiting for opportune moments if one must attack the defenses of 
a large city.  The ninth addresses the material strength of the revolutionaries- they must 
“replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the 
enemy.  Our Army’s main sources of manpower and material are at the front.”61 And the 
final principle explains the necessity of using intervals between fighting to rest, train, and 
consolidate, but also to not let these intervals grow so long as to let the enemy relax.  
These ten main principles served as the basic tactical thinking in the greater scheme of 
the strategic thought of the Protracted War. 
 Now, if we examine these concepts in terms of the Eritrean struggle it is striking 
how often they align with the key events of the war itself and its eventual successful 
conclusion.  The three stages of the Protracted War can be clearly seen, with the conflict 
actually repeating part of the evolution of the struggle to adapt to the changing situation.  
The strategic retreat was to prove a decisive factor in the determination of the dominant 
liberation front.  The base areas which were to provide so much of the logistical strength 
                                                 
61  Ibid., 286. 
 39
are obviously in evidence, so much so that an entire section following this one will be 
devoted to them and the social revolution they housed.  And lastly, although documented 
evidence for all of them is certainly not forthcoming and sometimes the principles were 
ignored (often to the detriment of the cause) a great many of Mao’s principles of 
operation can be seen quite plainly in the Eritrean prosecution of their struggle.   
 In terms of the Protracted Struggle itself, the experience of the ELF and the EPLF 
(to a far greater degree) reflected the Maoist thought at work in African liberation 
struggles of time.  The Strategic Defensive period can originally be seen in the early days 
of the struggle, specifically from 1961 to approximately 1968.  During this time the ELF 
had fled from the urban centers that had originally been its political bases and fled to the 
Western Sahel region while its leadership existed in exile in Cairo.  As pressure from the 
Ethiopian military pressed them further from their base areas, they often found 
themselves retreating to base areas across the border in the Sudan, where the new waves 
of university educated recruits found them in the slowly growing base areas across the 
border.62  It was during this period of limited guerrilla activity and cross-border 
withdrawals that the liberation front husbanded its strength until it was ready to begin 
formal expansion within Eritrea proper.  While this is perhaps a borderline example, the 
conception of the strategic defensive and retreat is seen far more clearly in response to 
the Soviet backed offensives of 1978, where the EPLF found itself facing a massive 
resurgent Ethiopian army that had tipped the balance of power back in favor of 
Mengistu’s state.  The EPLF leadership determined that any attempt to hold onto their 
laborious gains against the steamrolling Ethiopian forces would endanger the survival of 
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the revolution itself.  As such, the EPLF abandoned what they considered “secondary” 
objectives such as Massawa and Keren to consolidate their forces and attempt to bring 
about a future situation where the balance of power might be more equal.  Their forces 
retreated in a series of holding actions all the way back to their base region around Nacfa, 
which had been prepared for a prolonged static positional defense.  Tellingly, EPLF 
fighters even referred to this withdrawal as their “Long March” equating it with the 1934 
long strategic retreat of Mao’s own forces to the vast spaces of Western China.  Once 
ensconced in Nacfa, the EPLF forces were able to bring about far more advantageous 
conditions, including better terrain to fight, a consolidation of forces, and a completely 
loyal and enthusiastic general population that would serve as an excellent logistical base 
from which to fight the Ethiopians.  With these alterations of conditions, by the time the 
Ethiopians had prepared their next offensives, the Eritrean forces had already created the 
conditions to transition to the strategic stalemate and to begin dismantling their pursuers.  
On the other hand, the fate of the ELF over the same period perhaps does even more to 
reflect the efficacy of the Maoist strategy.  Although they faced a far greater concerted 
assault than the EPLF, the ELF leadership refused to enact a strategic retreat and instead 
chose to fight the Ethiopians from their newly liberated areas.  Within weeks the ELF 
lines were broken and they were retreating in a panic.63  In the aftermath of the 
Ethiopian offensives the ELF was spent as a military force and the vast majority of its 
fighters were absorbed into the now safely entrenched EPLF. 
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63  Connell, Against All Odds, 163-165. 
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 As to the strategic stalemate, again several periods of the Eritrean conflict fit 
within the Maoist framework.  From 1968 to 1974 both the ELF and the emerging EPLF 
were establishing those regions which would serve as their base areas and slowly 
expanding their guerrilla operations.  During this time Haile Selassie’s army was under 
constant harassment and could not effectively deal with the swarming raids that were 
taking their toll on communications and logistics.  It was also during this period that both 
fronts established their social programs which defined the Eritrea they each hoped to 
bring about following the conflict.  In spreading these ideals and social frameworks, they 
also established their base areas that served as centers from which further expansion of 
their forces could come.  Frontline fighters and militia were recruited, workshops and 
medical services were established, and new political organizations were formed.  It was 
this process of winning over the populace that again created the conditions for the 
transition to the next stage of combat. 
 The strategic stalemate was also illustrated in the Nacfa period following the 
strategic retreat of 1978 and lasting until approximately 1984.  Much like the “Long 
March” of the EPLF better illustrated the conception of the strategic retreat, the Nacfa 
period better shows the idea of the strategic stalemate, reflecting the increasing maturity 
of the EPLF military command.  As mentioned, the retreat to Nacfa accomplished a 
number of strategic objectives: it preserved the nationalist front’s armed forces, it 
consolidated them in the face of overwhelming enemy forces, it established them closer 
to their own base of support in Nacfa and northern Eritrea, it established their forces in 
far more advantageous terrain, and it also forced the Ehtiopian forces to extend 
themselves and their lines of communication even further into rugged Eritrean territory.  
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With these factors established, the Eritreans needed to accomplish two simple military 
goals: grow their own strength while reducing that of the Ethiopians in preparation for a 
strategic counter offensive.  To accomplish these goals, the Eritreans resorted to a 
combination of positional and guerrilla warfare.64  The guerrillas wreaked havoc on the 
extended Ethiopian lines of communication while the fortified lines of the Eritreans 
withstood four separate offensives in 1979 alone.  These offensives cost the Ethiopians 
massive amounts of men and material lost, while the Eritreans reaped a large amount of 
captured arms and ammunition.65  The lines were again tested in 1982 by the “Red Star” 
campaign, which again did little more than waste massive amounts of men and 
armaments while increasing Eritrean morale and arms caches.  With this the Eritreans felt 
they were ready to enter the counter-offensive stage by 1983, but a series of local 
counter-attacks by the still massive Ethiopian forces, including one of comparable size to 
the “Red Star” took place over the period of 1983-1985, delaying but not denying the 
inevitable shift in strategic initiative and strength which signaled the beginnings of the 
final strategic offensive stage of the war.66 
 However, the strategic offensives of 1987-1991 were not the first of the struggle.  
Following the strategic stalemate period of 1974, the downfall of Haile Selassie and the 
                                                 
64  Interestingly, positional warfare is almost always avoided under Maoist doctrine, as it removes 
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confusion and excesses of the Derg led to a tipping of the scales in terms of power and 
strategic initiative.   Both the ELF and EPLF, flush with recruits and captured weapons, 
went on the offensive and slowly but surely expanded to control the vast majority of 
Eritrea.  This was the period during which Asmara was cut off from Massawa in the 
standard practice of isolating the cities and saving them for last.  Local superiority 
allowed the EPLF to capture Keren in an astonishingly brief assault.67   From 1974-1978 
both liberation fronts did their best to liberate and educate the countryside and then 
slowly envelop the cities.  This course was only reversed when the unexpected military 
intervention of the Soviets suddenly altered the balance of forces again and made the 
conditions supremely unfavorable to the strategic offensive of the Eritreans.  This left 
1978 as the high water mark of the struggle until the reopening of the strategic offensive 
in 1987 by the EPLF and its allied liberation fronts. 
 The final counter-offensives beginning in 1987 were due to a combination of 
factors that weakened the Ethiopians severely and at least kept the EPLF from suffering 
the same fate.  The failed offensives of 1979-1985 drained the Ethiopian forces of men 
and weapons and emboldened the large number of guerrilla fronts now actively fighting 
within Ethiopia itself.  Beyond military overreach, Ethiopia was in the midst of one of the 
most severe famines the world had ever seen.  Although food aid was diverted to their 
military, Ethiopia was slowly starving and popular support of the Mengistu regime was 
almost nonexistent.  In opposition to this the EPLF was as strong as it had ever been.  It 
had absorbed what was left of the ELF’s armed forces, it had captured a vast amount of 
military hardware from the Ethiopian forces over the course of their failed attacks in the 
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north, it had fostered several of the now mature guerrilla fronts that were tearing their 
enemy apart from the inside, and while not well stocked with food by any means, their 
base areas produced some amount of food and their efficient social programs such as the 
Eritrean Relief Association ensured that they were at least in not as bad of shape as the 
Ethiopians.  The balance of power had shifted for the last time and the strategic offensive 
began in December 1987 as the EPLF forces overran the Ethiopian defenses outside of 
Nacfa.  Their mobile conventional forces sought out local advantages against the 
weakening Ethiopian forces in an attempt to obtain a decisive victory and on March 17th, 
1988 secured one.  The Battle of Afabet raged for 3 days and saw the complete 
destruction of the Ethiopian northern command.  There were over 15,000 Ethiopian 
casualties and the EPLF again captured vast stocks of arms and vehicles, including over 
50 tanks.  Whereas the Eritreans compared their earlier withdrawal with the famous 
“Long March,” now the world took notice and compared Afabet with Dien Bien Phu, the 
decisive Vietnamese victory over the French colonial forces in the first Indochina war.68  
From this point the offensive was essentially unbroken and the Eritrean forces could even 
feel the momentum on the ground level.69  The countryside was overrun and in 1990 
Massawa and Decamere were recaptured and by 1991 Asmara and Addis Ababa were 
taken in the final offensives of the liberation struggle. 
 As such, although some of the theoretical aspects would run into the altered 
circumstances of the Eritrean situation, by holding true to Mao’s conception of protracted 
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war. 
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warfare and not being afraid of adopting a defensive or even withdrawing pattern, the 
Eritrean Liberation movements endured the worst that an opponent alternatively armed 
by the two superpowers could throw at them.  The idea of withdrawing from an enemy’s 
strength until advantage was regained was internalized within the EPLF in particular and 
proved to be a decisive lesson.   No matter the military strength of the Ethiopia, which at 
its height had the largest army in Africa, the Eritreans could never be pinned down for a 
decisive battle.  By prioritizing the survival of the insurgency, the Eritreans continuously 
drained their opponents of men, material, and morale until the balance of forces had 
permanently shifted in their favor, allowing them to secure their ultimate victory on the 
battlefield. 
 
Chapter 2.3.  Eritrean and the Social Revolution 
 
 Without the outright defeat of the Ethiopian forces, no doubt the political 
separation of the two countries would have been an impossibility.  However, Mao’s 
lessons revolve around the idea of base areas and the loyalty and support of the people- 
the peasants and proletariat that provide the raw material for the struggle.70  Without 
these men and women, the armed forces would never win their victories and the 
guerrillas would be fish attempting to swim in a hostile sea.  As such, the military victory 
of the Eritreans, again the EPLF in particular, stem ultimately from the social revolution 
                                                                                                                                                 
69  Connell gives several excellent anecdotes of the EPLF’s feelings of morale and momentum.  The 
most telling of the shift of power is that of the EPLF’s dismissal of the “Sparta” brigades and their 
gimmickry.  See Connell, Against All Odds, 235. 
70  These ideas are central to most other revolutionary war theorists of the time, with Vo Nguyen 
Giap’s People’s War, People’s Army stressing the necessity of popular peasant and proletariat support.  
Even Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare put forth the idea of a people’s war, although the Cuban Revolution 
at its heart was based in the bourgeoisie. 
 46
they affected in the countryside and cities which created an Eritrean identity and 
mobilized the populace.  This mobilized populace in turn not only formed the base areas 
that offered succor and strength during the conflict, but also served as the strong 
foundation for the emergent Eritrean nation. 
 While both fronts stressed the social transformation of Eritrea as a component of 
the struggle, the ELF was not as radical as their brethren in the EPLF and consequently 
did not affect such a startling transformation.  While they did establish medical and relief 
services under the Eritrean Red Cross-Red Crescent society, they did not expand the 
medical services well beyond this.  In terms of their village restructuring, they tended to 
establish village committees but leave them in the hands of traditional powers of the 
village. While they did establish several mass organizations such as the General Union of 
Eritrean Workers, the General Union of Eritrean Students, the Eritrean Women’s General 
Union, the General Union of Eritrean Peasants, and the Eritrean Democratic Youth 
Union, these and the subsequent contributions to the struggle itself were more of 
reactions to the more radical political transformations going on in the EPLF.71  This was 
a pattern that was all too familiar, as the ELF tended to view the struggle as paramount 
and the social revolution as a secondary objective that could be handled after the war had 
been won.  As such, the ELF was forced to then react when the more developed and 
mature social programs of the EPLF began to draw in much greater support from the 
populace.  To put it simply, the social programs of the ELF were generally shallow and 
reactive and consequently only generated shallow support for their cause.  The effect of 
this policy can then be seen again in the aftermath of the 1978 reverses, where the ELF 
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was displaced and shattered by the Ethiopian advance whereas the EPLF had prepared 
loyal base regions to retreat through and to and which welcomed them again when they 
returned on the offensive.72   
 Of course, to create those loyal base regions the EPLF created an entirely 
transformative program and ideal for the emergent Eritrean consciousness.  By building 
off a basis of five major mass organizations (for workers, peasants, women, students, and 
youth, just like the reactive organizations of the ELF) which began to operate openly in 
1977 after years of clandestine organizing, the EPLF enunciated a completely 
transformative program which would alter the very fabric of Eritrean society.  This 
program’s stated goals would completely rebuild Eritrea in terms of agricultural 
production, industrial production, education, health care, and even gender relations. 
  In terms of agricultural production and relations, the Eritrean general program for 
reform called for a socialized agricultural sector with control placed back in the hands of 
the producers.  In theory the program claimed its goals as including the nationalization of 
the lands expropriated by the Ethiopians and their feudal collaborators and revising this 
into larger collective farms for the use of the masses.  It also sought to introduce more 
modern farming methods, including the use of machinery and modern fertilizers to help 
increase the productivity of the peasant class.  For the still existing pastoralists, veterinary 
and breeding aid would be provided as well as financial aid to help them become 
sedentary and successful animal breeders.  Beyond all these (and several other small 
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provisions) it purported to allow for the amicable and fair resolution of land inequality 
and ownership disputes while providing for the organization and collectivization of 
peasants so they may look after their own affairs.73  For the most part these goals were 
reached.  Self-sustaining cells of peasant organizers set up village committees that 
represented all strata of agricultural life.  In such model villages as Zagher they oversaw 
the redistribution of land that had been monopolized by richer farming families and 
settled disputes within the community.74   While this was a long process, by the end of it 
large numbers of peasants that had never had land of their own to work had plots to 
produce with.  Often surplus land could then be farmed collectively by the newly set up 
farmers association, the produce of which then went into a cooperative shop.  The 
individual plots as well were allocated along the lines of the association membership, 
which organized them in such a way so as to allow the easier introduction of new farming 
techniques.  The front even trained “barefoot veterinarians” along the lines of China’s 
famous barefoot doctors to offer free veterinary services to the pastoral and agricultural 
population’s animals. 
 Similar alterations were made to the structure of industrial production and 
relations.  Much like the Ethiopian- and collaborator- owned land, the industries held by 
these proscribed groups would be nationalized along with the vital large industries of the 
nation itself, such as the ports, mines, public transport, and power.  Meanwhile foreign 
owned industries of a small scale would be allowed as long as the owners were from 
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nations that had not opposed Eritrean independence.75  To aid growth in the industrial 
sector, urban land would be made state property along with excess urban housing.  The 
rent for this housing would then be set at a reasonable level for the standard of living in 
the region by the managing government.  The citizens whose property was thus 
nationalized would be duly compensated for their losses.76  In terms of the workers 
themselves, their rights were to be strictly safeguarded, partially by the organization and 
politicization of the workers themselves.  These stated rights included an eight hour 
workday and at maximum a six day work week as well as social security nets for age and 
disability.  The nationalized urban property would be made available to these organized 
workers to assure them decent living conditions.  Most tellingly, the politicized workers 
would be given the right to “participate in the management and administration of 
enterprises and industries.”77  By offering the workers organizations, security, and strong 
interest in the continuation of the national industries, the EPLF theoretically offered a 
complete revolution to the working class.  Again, much like the agricultural reforms, the 
EPLF were able to implement the vast majority of these while the struggle was still going 
on.  During their administration of Keren in 1977 they retained the status of the 
previously nationalized housing but slashed the price of the rents, particularly the lowest 
rents to further aid those distressed by the conflict.78  They also changed the pay scale 
for workers, lowering those that were highest while dramatically increasing those that 
had been lowest.79  As to the industries themselves, even as early as 1975-76 the EPLF 
                                                 
75  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 2, Section B. 
76  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 2, Section E. 
77  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 4, Section A, Part 8. 
78  Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 123-124. 
79  Ibid., 124. 
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liberated zones had a plurality of small cottage industries sustained by and sustaining the 
revolution.  Woodworking collectives altered weaponry while machine shops fabricated 
parts for everything from weaponry to generators and agricultural machinery.  These 
small front-run workshops were acknowledged to be the future of the nation: “These 
small shops are going to be the base for the new Eritrea.”80  The collective work, reform, 
and politicization of the industrial base of the revolution played a vital role in the conflict. 
 In every sector the greatest emphasis was placed on education.  Free compulsory 
education, grants and scholarships, the establishment of more primary schools and 
institutes of higher education, and most importantly the pledge to “Combat illiteracy to 
free the Eritrean people from the darkness of ignorance”81 were central to the 
educational revolution that the EPLF insisted on for their nation.  While it might be 
thought that most of these goals could only effectively be pursued in peacetime, perhaps 
more than any other sector of its Revolution the EPLF made education a ubiquitous part 
of their struggle.  The EPLF demanded that all members serving in the front be literate in 
Arabic or Tingrinya and established this training for the both the older members and the 
‘Vanguards,’ the youth that were inducted into the struggle initially in non-combatant 
roles until they reached of age.  These new inductees were also given educations in 
history, political theory, first aid and public health, and other basic subjects.  In the EPLF 
run refugee camps and liberated towns classes were given in political theory, the history 
of Eritrea, and most of all literacy.  These same literacy courses were run out of the 
hospitals for those rehabilitating from injuries, as well as courses in geography, and 
                                                 
80  Connell, Against All Odds, 40. 
81  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 3, Section B, Part 1. 
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elementary math.82  Astonishingly these same sorts of courses were also provided to 
Ethiopian prisoners-of-war, the vast majority of which were illiterate conscripted 
peasants.  Beyond the training in the field, the EPLF established and ran over 36 schools 
in 1976 alone.83  While it cannot be said that the education was given for entirely selfless 
reasons, as a cynical observer can easily claim that such education is better labeled 
indoctrination, it cannot be denied that the mass teaching of literacy altered the entire 
philosophical base of the nation and helped spread the conception of Eritrea as more than 
a collection of nine separate nationalities. 
 Hand in hand with education was the complete overhaul of public health services.  
The EPLF sought to establish a system of free public health care that not only treated the 
populace at large, but served as a basis for locally manufactured medicines and as centers 
for the eradication of contagious diseases.84  Public health was paramount.  In this, as 
like in much else of their goals, they made remarkable headway.  Two tiers of medical 
training (a basic and an intermediate) were established to produce a greater amount of 
qualified medical personnel to man the expanding programs as the movement gained 
maturity.  As of 1977 alone the EPLF was operating 4 major hospitals with a combined 
capacity of nearly 1400 patients.85  These facilities were equipped with basic medical 
necessities such as microscopes, refrigerators, and X-ray machines.  Beyond these central 
hospitals, the front operated over 20 intermediate clinics established in liberated or semi-
liberated areas to deal with regional patients and even had limited inpatient capabilities.  
To supplement these formal facilities, teams of doctors were trained to travel the largely 
                                                 
82  Connell, Against All Odds, 38-39. 
83  Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 104. 
84  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 3, Section C. 
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rural areas in the mold of the “Barefoot Doctors” to inoculate the populace as well as 
offer free medical care to the villages.  Over the course of their struggle the EPLF 
extended medical services to the populace at large where there had been essentially no 
formal health services previously. 
 Lastly, and perhaps the most radical step taken in their social revolutionary 
program, the EPLF obliterated the previous conceptions of gender roles in their liberated 
areas.  Whereas Eritrea had long been an extremely conservative and patriarchal state 
regardless of region, the EPLF explicitly stated their goals for women’s rights.  They 
were to be freed from domestic confinement, be assured full rights of equality in 
representation, pay, and participation, and progressive marriage and family laws were to 
be established.86  Beyond this the EPLF promised to respect the right to maternity leave, 
to provide maternal services, and even to try and eradicate prostitution, which they 
viewed as a violent act against women.  It would be right of a commentator to be 
skeptical though, as it is common for revolutionary movements to exalt women’s rights 
and yet do little to attain them.87  However, like all other provisions within its programs, 
the EPLF did a remarkable job in attaining its goals under the pressures of wartime.  First 
and foremost, women were organized as an important part of the front and were always 
given equal representation within the political structure of the EPLF itself.  They were 
not barred from serving in any capacity within the front and women commonly took 
combatant roles, with women constituting 13% of the army by 1977.88  The education 
                                                                                                                                                 
85  Sherman, Eritrea: the Unfinished Revolution, 102 
86  “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 4, Section B. 
87  Notably the role of women in the aftermath of the success of the FLN has been cited as less than 
satisfactory. 
88  Sherman, Eritrea: the Unfinished Revolution, 106. 
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programs offered by the front were perhaps even more revolutionary for the women 
involved, as literacy had been even rarer amongst women than men before the conflict.  
However, the alterations to women’s rights did not stop within the boundaries of direct 
service to the front.  In liberated areas the land reform was just as open to women as men 
and women were amongst those that claimed plots of land in Zagher and other model 
villages.  As the EPLF’s programs became more ingrained into the social fabric of 
communities, they often began taking on variations of their marriage law.  This was a 
revolutionary step, as marriage was a defining characteristic in traditional Eritrean 
society, where it essentially relegated women to a servile role.89  With the new laws 
being put into place, concepts of mutual consent for marriages became common as well 
as a woman’s right to divorce.  Beyond this ages of consent began being established, 
doing away with child-marriages which had the effect of opening up a whole new world 
of independent adolescence for young women, transforming their possibilities in 
education, employment, and even newer ideas of courtship.  Although this is not to say 
that all communities accepted these changes quickly or easily, the balance of sexual 
power was altered by the social revolution of the EPLF and women were to a great 
degree liberated from their previous servitude.90 
 The social revolution altered Eritrea irrevocably and even at the time was noted 
for its far reaching consequences.  No less a scholar of revolutions than Gerard Chaliand 
wrote “the EPLF is by far the most impressive revolutionary movement produced in 
                                                 
89  Connell does an excellent job explaining the extraordinary effects that these reforms had on 
women’s lives in Eritrea.  His chapter “Destroying Shyness” is an excellent window into the process 
(Connell, Against All Odds, 127-137). 
90  Connell also offers an interesting look into the interconnectedness of the revolutionary 
consciousness with the refusal of poor peasants to consent to the stripping of Eritrean women of their 
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Africa in the past two decades.”  This complete social revolution would prove to be vital 
to the success of the Eritrean struggle for two primary reasons.  The first was that the 
revolution and the acceptance of its precepts more than anything else helped the Eritrean 
cause overcome the regional, linguistic, and confessional barriers to national unity.  
While earlier attempts in Katanga and Biafra both faltered when ethnic differences helped 
fracture efforts of secession, following the adoption of the social revolution there never 
was a credible threat of ethnic or religious divisions within the Eritrean front.  Even later 
attempts at secession constantly found (and still find) themselves hobbled by the disunity 
often flippantly referred to by the press as “tribalism.” The Sudanese efforts have been 
almost crippled by the fighting between Dinka and Nuer interests.  Other following 
efforts such as the Azawad movement or the Casamance separatists are not so much 
hobbled by ethnic divisions as they are by their lack of an overarching ideology that can 
transcend their narrowly defined nationalisms and attract a wide enough base of support 
to succeed.  By adopting a social revolution and using it to advance precepts that created 
a national ideology and identity which was accepted and proliferated by the populace, the 
EPLF created a nation in the process of liberating it. 
 The second major reason for the importance of the social revolution has already 
been discussed in a passing manner in the previous paragraphs: the creation of loyal and 
productive base areas are a necessity for the pursuit of a protracted conflict.  By large 
scale agrarian reform, worker’s rights, women’s rights, education, and health care the 
EPLF created a popular front that earned the peoples’ loyalty and efforts.  More than this, 
in the model villages and towns and amongst the workshops and hospitals in the remote 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights, rightly seeing the parallels between their own new-found freedoms and those of women.  Connell, 
 55
regions, they created a popular society that then had a vested interest in seeing their 
revolution succeed in the only way that mattered: the military overthrow of the 
oppressive power.  As such the EPLF’s social revolution created areas that were loyal 
and productive for their efforts and which turned barren for their opponents.91  Put in 
Maoist terms, strategically they always had one of the necessary conditions for advantage 
and tactically the guerrillas always had a deep popular sea to swim in.  Put simply, the 
implementation of the social revolution created the conditions necessary for their military 
triumph. 
 
Chapter 2.4.  Eritrea and Pragmatic Relations 
 
 Lastly of the decisive anomalous factors that allowed the heretofore only 
successful political separation in Africa was what has been termed the EPLF’s pragmatic 
relations with other liberation fronts.  Given long duration of Eritrea’s conflict and 
Ethiopia’s autocratic governmental structure from shortly after World War Two until 
1991, it was inevitable that other resistance movements would have come into being.  A 
particularly large number were constituted shortly after the coup against Haile Sellassie 
and the beginning of the Derg’s oppressive Marxist turn in 1974.  Although most of these 
were to prove small movements that would not play major roles in the conflict, one in 
particular would prove to play a deciding part in the success of the secession of Eritrea.  
The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front began their armed struggle against the Ethiopian 
government in 1975 and quickly established relations with the two working Eritrea 
                                                                                                                                                 
Against All Odds, 136. 
91  Even after the return of Ethiopian troops in the 1978-1985 Offensives, the EPLF loyalist areas 
still resisted the Derg forces and clandestinely aided the EPLF, a decisive factor in the struggle. 
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fronts, the ELF and EPLF.92  Both fronts offered aid to the fledgling group, with which 
they shared linguistic and educational ties.  Although ties were severed with the ELF in 
1976 due to disputes over boundaries between Eritrea and Tigray, the TPLF established 
strong ties with the EPLF.93  The two fronts shared a Marxist viewpoint of their struggle 
and a common goal of self-criticism to keep their movements ideologically pure.  The 
EPLF even offered aid in material and training for the Tigrayans, with between three and 
four thousand Tigrayan fighters being sent to the Sahel for training with the Eritreans.  
These troops were to prove decisive in blunting the Ethiopian offensives in the early 
1980s directed against the Eritreans.94   
This is not to say that the two fronts always saw eye to eye.  There was 
widespread disagreement between the two as to the tactics to be employed for the 
struggle.  In 1980 the EPLF had transitioned into a conventional and increasingly 
professional military structure in their strategic stalemate with Ethiopia, fighting battles 
from fixed positions and holding their liberated territory in open battle.95  The Tigrayans 
felt that this distanced the fighters from the populace as well as increasing the losses 
inflicted on the front needlessly.  The TPLF remained adamant that a guerrilla war from 
the countryside was the only method that would allow success against the Soviet backed 
Derg.  Beyond this, there was a fundamental difference in their goals.  While the EPLF 
                                                 
92  The current best work on the subject of the TPLF is John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: 
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
93  During this same time period the ELF established closer ties with other Ethiopian dissident 
groups such as the Ethiopian Democratic Union and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party.  These 
unfortunately did not prove as successful as the TPLF and during the second Eritrean Civil War the TPLF 
helped drive the ELF out of Eritrean and Tigrayan territory. 
94  Pool, From Guerrillas to Government, 149 and Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples 
Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism,” 107. 
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was a secession insurgency, looking to physically separate their nation from the state, the 
TPLF was a reform insurgency, intent on using the state apparatus to carry out a social 
revolution.  As part of the TPLFs goals, they embraced the concept that each separate 
ethnic group of a state can and should form its own front and have the right to self-
determination.  This was a no-sell to the Eritrean Front, which fought for the centrality of 
a nation and denied the concept of ethnic self-determination.96  This fundamental 
difference led to deep tensions, exacerbated by the Tigrayan’s insistence of denouncing 
the Soviet Union due to its support of the Derg and the Eritrean’s continued pursuit of an 
alliance.97   
In 1985 the two fronts formally severed diplomatic ties due to these continued 
tensions, with the TPLF going so far as to offer support to a minor rival opposition front 
in Eritrea.98  However, the TPLF continued to support the concept of Eritrean 
independence, which left to door open for a rapprochement which was not long in 
coming.  This new agreement was hastened by Ethiopia’s settlement with Somalia over 
the Ogaden region in 1988,99 which freed up massive numbers of troops to continue the 
conflicts against the regional insurgencies.  From 1988 on the TPLF and EPLF formed a 
coordinated front with agreed upon goals and aims for their partnership.  This united 
front between the Eritreans and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
                                                                                                                                                 
95  Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean People’s Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and 
Pragmatism,” 108.  As mentioned in note 63, this is part of a larger debate as to the timing of the alterations 
of mode of warfare in the Maoist framework of conflict.  
96  Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 152-154. 
97  Ibid., 154-155.   
98  Ibid., 156-157.  This splinter group, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrea 
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99  Despite the Ogaden War’s conclusion in 1978, Ethiopia and Somali each maintained significant 
troop levels in the region and tensions remained high.  After a small clash in 1988, the two countries agreed 
to withdraw their troops from the border region. 
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(the multiethnic coalition that the Tigrayans welded together and headed) launched a 
series of offensives that finally caused the Ethiopian regime to crumble in 1991.  This 
was the deciding moment for both insurgencies. 
 One cannot overestimate the importance of the common goals and aims adopted 
between the Eritreans and the Tigrayans.  Initially the two provided shared intelligence 
and logistics to pursue the protracted struggles that would bleed the Ethiopian regime dry.  
By broadening the base of the conflict, the two fronts working in combination crushed 
attempts by the Derg to put an end to the conflict for over a decade.  The so called 
‘Ethiopian Peasant Crusade’ was destroyed with little fanfare in 1976.  The two fronts 
also worked together to stymie the efforts of the massive Ethiopian ‘Red Star’ campaign 
in 1982, the defeat of which essentially doomed any further efforts by the Derg to crush 
either front.  Beyond this military coordination was the decisive nature of their 
relationship.  By maintaining relations with the Tigrayans and aiding in the success of 
their reform insurgency,100 the Eritreans ensured their own reward at the completion of 
the campaign.  With a sympathetic government now in power over their previous colonial 
oppressor, the Eritreans claimed their share of the spoils- a declaration of recognition of 
their independence in 1991.   
 The importance of this declaration of recognition is especially important given the 
political difficulties that had been established in terms of secession in Africa.  For the 
OAU to recognize a seceding region would require a motion to be brought before it by a 
member state.  However, just any member would not do- as the case of Biafra amply 
                                                 
100  Interestingly, the TPLF itself began as a separatist insurgency and only later became a reform 
insurgency by Clapham’s definition.  The transition left them in an interesting form, as they advocated 
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shows.  If an external power tried to bring forward a motion to recognize a separatist or 
secessionist movement, the ‘host nation’ could invoke article III and argue that it was 
their own internal business and their sovereignty in such matters must be respected.  It 
was this dynamic which made the alliance with the TPLF and their greater organization 
the EPDRF so vital.  Without the EPDRF driving out Mengistu’s forces and achieving 
their own sovereign rule over the nation of Ethiopia, there would be no guarantee of 
recognition at all.  It was only by their effective and pragmatic relations with the now-
ruling party of Ethiopia that the EPLF was able to gain the sponsorship of their own host 
nation for their separation and the agreement to allow a referendum two years later to 
determine the future political status.  With the ruling regime in Addis Ababa giving their 
blessing to the actions within their own territory, there was little that the international 
community could see wrong with the formal separation of the two states in 1993.  Simply 
put, without the simultaneous reform insurgency, the secession of Eritrea would have 
been an impossibility.
                                                                                                                                                 
nationalist separatism but in a federal form under a greater Ethiopian government. See Christopher 
Clapham. African Guerrillas. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998), 6-7. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The Eritrean struggle for independence could not have occurred without all four 
of the previous factors having interacted within the context of the greater Eritrean 
struggle.  Simply declaring a historical separation had been tried in both Katanga and 
Biafra, but despite these histories and their claims to independent existence under 
international laws, both secessionist attempts were overwhelmed on the battlefield.  This 
rendering all legal arguments moot when the secessionist enclaves ceased to exist.  This 
left the successful military prosecution of the conflict as a priority despite the historical 
claims of the secessionist state.  However, as a secessionist state was by nature an 
unrecognized fragment of its host state, there was no conventional way for a secessionist 
front to win a military solution; the host state naturally had a larger logistical base and 
could also access international aid.  In this situation, asymmetric methods such as Mao's 
conception of protracted war were necessary.  But, these methods of waging war relied 
on a popular front and mass participation.  This meant that actions needed to be taken to 
engage he populace in the struggle.  The Eritreans, among other protracted fronts 
throughout history, found the best way to accomplish this was fomenting a social 
revolution to mobilize the people.  Finally, even these methods might have failed in the 
face of international law without the open sponsorship of their secession by the 
government of Ethiopia.  The EPLF's pragmatic relations with their neighboring reform 
insurgencies insured international support for their separation at the end of the conflict.  
All four factors relied on each other to succeed and would most likely have failed in 
isolation.   
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 Given the infrequency of these factors being found within a single conflict, it 
remains unlikely that other secessionist movements will ever replicate their success, with 
the lone possible exception of the South Sudan.  However, if one looks at the current 
situation that has brought South Sudan to its own plebiscite, one sees a mirror image of 
these conditions: an anomalous history, given the South's separate colonial 
administration; a protracted war, with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army fighting a 
long and organized guerrilla war; a social revolution engendered by the SPLM 
throughout the struggle in the 1980s and 90s; and although the Northern government has 
not been completely overthrown by the SPLA and their allies, it has instead acceded to 
plebiscites to avoid their probably overthrow.  However, their current and possible future 
success shows the continued difficulty of secession in Africa and the rarity of the so far 
unique solution Eritrea enacted to seize their independence. 
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